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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission took up the question whether a state
law barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation could be
applied to a business whose owner had religious objections to
participating in a same-sex wedding. The decision turned on the
majority’s finding that the Commission’s ruling against Masterpiece
Cakeshop was tainted by anti-religious animus, an impermissible basis
for government action. The Court did not need to reach the broader
question of whether a law like Colorado’s could constitutionally be
applied if the agency acted without the impermissible animus. In this
article I argue that the Court’s emphasis on animus was consistent with
principles deeply embedded in constitutional jurisprudence, from several
provisions of the First Amendment, to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For this reason, it is critical that government
actors base their decisions on grounds other than animus. This includes
legislators. While Masterpiece Cakeshop involved animus at the
enforcement stage, a similar result is likely if hostility to religion played
a substantial role in the legislature’s passage of the law. I examine the
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passage of a Utah law barring discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity, and the consideration of a similar law in
Kentucky, as models for demonstrating compromise with, and respect
for, religious views. This process can insulate these laws from claims that
they were the product of anti-gay animus.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.,
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission raised profound and complex
questions about how to balance competing civil rights claims.1 On the
one hand, the petitioners—a bakery and its owner (Jack Phillips) who
had refused to prepare a cake for a same-sex couple’s wedding—argued
that their rights of free speech and free exercise were infringed by the
order of the respondent (the Colorado Civil Rights Commission)
finding that they had violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act
(“CADA”).2 On the other hand, the Commission sought to vindicate

1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
2. Id. at 1723.
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the right of the couple who filed the complaint against the bakery to be
free from discrimination.3 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
drew on the core concept of tolerance to reconcile these competing
claims, holding that the government may not act from a place of
intolerance towards the religious beliefs of one citizen—the bakeshop
owner, in this case—in the course of enforcing the rights of another—
here, the gay couple.
The decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop has important implications
for the development and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws,
particularly in their protection of sexual and gender minorities. This is
not the first time the Court has found that the First Amendment
imposes limits on the ability of state and local governments to afford
such protections,4 making it all the more important to understand
exactly where the line is, and thus what those governments may and
may not do in enforcing anti-discrimination laws.
In my view, Masterpiece Cakeshop is consistent with other decisions,
some recent and some venerable, which draw a constitutional line
between tolerance and intolerance.5 In particular, while the opinion
may seem at first glance to be in tension with the Court’s decisions
establishing constitutional protection of the right of same-sex couples
to marry,6 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Windsor, and Obergefell actually
reflect the same principle: governments may not make decisions
affecting a fundamental right on the basis of intolerance of or hostility
towards the group exercising the right. This principle is apparent in

3. Id. (“The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two
principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights
and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they
seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms
under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
4. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (striking down application of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, under which the state sought to prohibit the Boy Scouts
from applying its policy barring gay men from being scoutmasters, as a violation of the Scouts’
right of expressive association).
5. In using the terms “tolerance” and “intolerance,” I will define them in the way I believe
the Court has in marking the line between permissible and impermissible government action.
Such action is based on impermissible intolerance when a particular group is singled out based
simply on the disapproval of some aspect of the group’s identity or constitutionally protected
status or conduct. For example, intolerance may be directed at a group’s racial identity, see
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), religious practice, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), or speech, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
6. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (striking down state laws denying same-sex
couples marriage licenses and refusing to recognize validity of out-of-state marriages); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down the federal Defense of Marriage Act’s
section denying federal recognition to marriages valid in the state where they were celebrated).
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much of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of the last three
decades. For example, in the case of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
has distinguished between neutral laws that happen to affect religion
or religious practice (which do not violate the First Amendment), and
laws that discriminate against religion and thus manifest bias . . . or
intolerance.7
To pass antidiscrimination statutes and ordinances in line with
Masterpiece Cakeshop, legislatures must ensure that their regulations
do not reflect governmental hostility towards the religious views of
those who refuse to comply with those laws. What is less clear, however,
is the relevance of the motives of those who enact the laws in the first
place. In this article, I suggest that those who seek to enact such laws
and give them their maximum effect must take care to ensure that the
legislative process is not tainted by the sort of anti-religious animus that
doomed the enforcement actions of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
Part I of this Article seeks to contextualize Masterpiece Cakeshop
within the Court’s broader jurisprudence establishing the principle that
the government may not enforce laws due to hostility to religion or
intolerance more generally. Part II will assess the applicability of this
principle to the enactment stage and argue that legislators must be as
careful as executive branch officials to avoid basing their actions on
animus—particularly anti-religious animus. Courts will find it
constitutionally problematic if legislation either singles out religion for
differential treatment or if the legislative record shows that a
substantial number of legislators were motivated by anti-religious bias.
To illustrate how the legislative process can operate to minimize the
risks that a statute will run afoul of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Part III will
discuss two instances in which the legislative process operated while
considering anti-discrimination laws in ways that were cognizant of, and
attempted to balance, religious concerns. Such a process is far more
likely to insulate the resulting legislation from constitutional scrutiny
while also decreasing the likelihood that the law will be enforced in a
constitutionally suspect way. In short, taking care in the legislative
process will protect an anti-discrimination law from being overturned
7. Compare Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [hereinafter “Smith II”] (holding that
neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if they impose
a substantial burden on religious exercise), with Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 521 (holding that a city
ordinance prohibiting ritual slaughter of animals was not neutral, but instead singled out religious
practice and violated the First Amendment).
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on its face, as well as prevent enforcement actions that are
unconstitutional applications of those laws.
I. MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
TOLERANCE
A consistent theme in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence—and even in some important areas of constitutional
interpretation outside the First Amendment—is that governmental
action based on intolerance is suspect and very likely to be
unconstitutional. This can be seen in cases decided under the Religion
Clauses8, the Free Speech Clause,9 and, outside the First Amendment,
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.10
It is important to note here that I intend no value judgments about
whether the Court should have built so much of modern constitutional
jurisprudence around the concept of tolerance, or even whether
tolerance is really a virtue, at least without reference to a clear-eyed
understanding of what is commanding our tolerance.11 It may well be
that tolerance should not occupy the central place it does in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, or at the very least that it should be
treated with more nuance. But my approach in this article is not to
critique the place of tolerance or suggest a shift. It is instead to describe
how the Court has elevated it to a core focus of a vast swath of

8. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”); see Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Establishment Clause); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Free Exercise Clause).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”); see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11. For instance, if the purpose of this article were to assess the merits of the Court’s choice
to make tolerance a centerpiece of its jurisprudence, it would be essential to evaluate the
undeniable costs associated with the idea of tolerating hate speech, given its impact on the ability
of racial and other minorities to enjoy the promise of equality that is embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why
Our Notion of a “Just Balance” Changes So Slowly, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 851, 852 (1994) (“For
[advocates of hate speech regulation], the relevant issue is whether campuses are free to impose
reasonable rules to protect the dignity and self-regard of vulnerable young African American
undergraduates and other targets of hate speech. These advocates place equality at the center of
the controversy and portray the defenders of racist invective as seeking to attack values emanating
from the equality-protecting Constitutional amendments.”).
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constitutional law, and then argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in
Masterpiece Cakeshop fits comfortably within that tradition.
A. Intolerance and the Religion Clauses
1. The Free Exercise Clause
One of the most important themes of the Supreme Court’s
decisions under the Free Exercise Clause has been that government
actions are unconstitutional if they specifically target or discriminate
against religiously-motivated conduct. This was the fundamental point
of Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Smith II, which
dealt with an Oregon policy denying unemployment compensation to
two individuals who had been fired because of their sacramental use of
a drug (peyote) whose use was illegal under the state’s drug possession
laws.12 The Court distinguished between laws that are neutral and
generally applicable and those which target religion for less favorable
treatment. According to Justice Scalia, the former do not violate the
Free Exercise Clause because
the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a “valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”13

Smith II involved a “neutral law of general applicability”: Oregon’s
law prohibiting the use of peyote, which did not specifically bar only
the religious use of peyote as a sacrament.14 Thus, the Free Exercise
Clause was of no use to the respondents in their effort to shield
themselves from the effects of the law—in this case, application of
Oregon’s rule that state employees discharged for work-related
misconduct are ineligible for unemployment compensation.15
12. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890 (1990) (Oregon statute criminalizing use of peyote, which was
neither directed specifically at religious use nor animated by anti-religious prejudice, may be
applied to sacramental use without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
13. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
14. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 875–76. In fact, the question about the scope of Oregon’s law was
not whether it covered only sacramental use of peyote, but whether its general bar on peyote
included religion—i.e., whether there was a religious exemption. The first time the case was
before the Supreme Court, it remanded the case for the Oregon Supreme Court to determine
whether the state law made religious use of peyote illegal. See Employment Division v. Smith, 485
U.S. 660 (1988) [hereinafter “Smith I”]. In short, there was never any doubt that the state had not
singled out religion for disfavored treatment, but only whether it had given religious use of peyote
more favorable treatment via an exemption.
15. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 874 (noting that the respondents were “determined to be ineligible
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Imagine, by contrast, that the Oregon law had rendered peyote
illegal only when it was used for sacramental purposes, and that the
respondents in Smith had been discharged for the same conduct and
then denied unemployment compensation. That hypothetical would
not alter the Court’s statement in Smith I that the illegality of the
underlying conduct is relevant to the constitutional claim,16 but it would
make it harder for the state to defend the statute’s constitutionality.
That is because the determination that the underlying conduct is illegal
(the key premise of the state’s argument) requires that the law making
it so be constitutional. If not—if the law singles out religion for
disfavored treatment—then the Court would revert to its holding that
the Free Exercise Clause bars the state from denying unemployment
compensation to “an employee who is required to choose between
fidelity to religious belief and cessation of work [and chooses to be]
faithful to the tenets of his or her church.”17
This point was reinforced shortly after Smith II, when the Court
dealt with city ordinances that barred “sacrifice” and “ritual” in the
slaughtering of animals in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah.18 The ordinances were challenged by a church and its
members who were adherents of the Santeria faith, one of whose tenets
was the practice of ritual animal sacrifice.19 They alleged that the
ordinances operated to single out the practice of slaughtering animals
only when it was done as part of a religious rite, and that members of
the Hialeah City Council were motivated by hostility towards the
Santeria faith.20 The City, for its part, argued that the ordinances were
neutral and generally applicable, and did not single out Santeria
religious practice.21

for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related ‘misconduct’”).
16. Smith I, 485 U.S. at 670 (“[I]f a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain
kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows
that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons
who engage in that conduct.”).
17. Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
18. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
19. Id. at 525.
20. Id. at 527–28.
21. Brief of the Respondent at 13, Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, Florida,
508 U.S. 520 (1993) (No. 91-948) (“Hialeah’s four ordinances are non-discriminatory, broadly
applicable regulations which protect animals from cruel treatment and protect people from the
health hazards attendant to the slaughter of large numbers of chickens, goats, and other animals.
Whether viewed separately or together, the ordinances are not targeted at animal sacrifices for
religious purposes, but all ritualistic killings of animals.”).
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In its decision, the Court made clear that, “[a]t a minimum, the
protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”22 In
applying that principle, the Court noted that a statute or ordinance
might impermissibly target religion either if it discriminates on its face
or if the object of those who enacted it was to disadvantage religious
practice.23 This point was significant in the Court’s analysis of the
ordinance at issue in Hialeah, because the majority found plausible
readings of the text of the law—which barred “sacrifice” and “ritual”
in the slaughtering of animals—which either singled out religion or
rendered the ordinance neutral.24 The city argued that if the text did not
on its face discriminate, the free exercise inquiry was at an end, but the
Court was unpersuaded.25 In critical language, Justice Kennedy wrote:
Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like
the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The
Clause “forbids subtle departures from neutrality” . . . and “covert
suppression of particular religious beliefs . . . .” Official action that
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental
hostility which is masked, as well as overt.26

In short, the constitutional validity of a law under the Free Exercise
Clause27 depends in large measure on whether that law singles out
religion because of intolerance for the religious basis for a behavior.

22. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 532.
23. Id. at 533–35.
24. Id. at 533–34 (agreeing with the petitioners that “these words are consistent with the
claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive”).
25. Id. at 534 (“We reject the contention advanced by the city . . . that our inquiry must end
with the text of the laws at issue.”).
26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. It is important to note here that I am not referring to whether a law is valid under the
federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., or one
of its many state-law equivalents. As the Court noted in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751 (2014), Congress created a statutory right to be protected from laws that burden
religious exercise that is broader than the constitutional right as the Court had defined it in Smith
II. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2761. Under RFRA, it is enough that even a neutral statute substantially
burdens religion to compel the government to defend the law under strict scrutiny; it need not
single out or discriminate against religion. Since even a neutral law can create a violation of
RFRA, it is less significant whether a government policy or act is motivated by anti-religious
animus than it is under the Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, it is not a trivial matter, since the
government’s task to justify a law that either facially discriminates against religion or whose
passage was motivated by anti-religious bias will be immeasurably harder.
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2. The Establishment Clause
Many of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases similarly
focus on the motivation for the enactment of a law or policy.
Government actions that are truly neutral towards religion are
extremely unlikely to be found to constitute an establishment, while
those that either show favoritism or hostility towards religion have
been struck down.28
The importance of neutrality is evident in a long line of the Court’s
decisions, set forth in Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors of the
University of Virginia.29 In Rosenberger, the University of Virginia
provided funding for student publications, thus creating a forum for
student speech.30 However, a religious student group had been
excluded from participation.31 When the students challenged the
exclusion as a viewpoint-based violation of their free speech rights, the
University argued that it had a compelling interest in the policy:
avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause.32 The Court rejected
this claim; since non-religious student groups could participate, the
program was entirely neutral and there was no Establishment Clause

28. In my view, the Court’s 2018 decision in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), is a
marked and troubling departure from this rule. There, the plaintiffs adduced powerful proof that
the real motivation behind Executive Order 2 was the Trump Administration’s anti-Muslim
animus. See id. at 2417 (summarizing the many statements made by candidate and then President
Trump that the motivation for the order was to target Muslims). Instead of finding this a basis for
overturning the order, the Court gave deference to the President’s “extraordinary power to speak
to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.” Id. at 2417–18. As to the statements, the Court
dismissed the argument that “this President’s words strike at fundamental standards of respect
and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional tradition,” by saying that “the issue before us is
not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of those statements in
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of
executive responsibility.” Id. at 2418. Simply because of this context, the Court utilized
circumscribed, rational basis review, a choice Justice Sotomayor’s dissent criticized as showing
the majority was willing “to throw the Establishment Clause out the window.” Id. at 2441 n.6
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). As Justice Sotomayor rightly recognized, “[t]hat approach is
perplexing, given that in other Establishment Clause cases, including those involving claims of
religious animus or discrimination, this Court has applied a more stringent standard of review.”
Id. at 2441 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that, in upholding Executive Order 2, the majority
never reckoned with the dissent’s claim that the order was deeply inconsistent with the Court’s
tradition of emphasizing intolerance as a basis for striking down government action. While Trump
v. Hawaii does not alter the conclusion that the tolerance tradition is long and powerful, it does
demonstrate that the Court can ignore or depart from that tradition in isolated cases.
29. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
30. See id. at 823–25 (describing the funding mechanism).
31. Id. at 827.
32. Id. at 837 (describing the University’s argument from the time the students filed their
complaint until its brief on the merits in the Supreme Court as having been that “inclusion of
WAP’s contractors in SAF funding authorization would violate the Establishment Clause”).
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violation to avoid.33 As Justice Kennedy’s opinion declared, “[a] central
lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is
their neutrality towards religion.”34 The Court noted that the
government may extend benefits to religious entities as long as they are
general in nature and religion does not uniquely benefit from the
program at issue.35
While earlier in the litigation the University of Virginia had pressed
the claim that it needed to exclude the religious group,36 the University
dropped the argument in its briefing for the Supreme Court.37 This
might have been because the argument’s strength had been deeply, if
not fatally, compromised by the Court’s decision two years earlier in
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District.38 In
Lamb’s Chapel, the school district, acting pursuant to state educational
law, made available school facilities for use after school hours by nonreligious community groups.39 In Rosenberger, the Court succinctly
described its earlier holding in Lamb’s Chapel, saying that a
government entity could not create a forum and discriminate against
religious groups by “enact[ing] a formal policy against opening [those]
facilities to groups for religious purposes.”40 Such anti-religious policies
could not be justified, the Court held, by concern that allowing the
religious group to use the forum would violate the Establishment
Clause: neutrality does not violate the Establishment Clause.41

33. Id. at 839.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
36. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269, 285–86 (4th
Cir. 1994) (discussing and adopting University’s argument that, even though its exclusion of
religious group from funding program infringed on the speech of the group, infringement was
justified by need to avoid advancing religion and becoming entangled with religious message),
rev’d and remanded, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
37. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837–38 (noting that the University “itself no longer presses the
Establishment Clause claim,” giving “some indication that it lacks force,” but addressing the issue
because “the Court of Appeals rested its judgment on the point and our dissenting colleagues
would find it determinative”).
38. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
39. Id. at 386–87.
40. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (discussing Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384).
41. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394–95 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981))
(rejecting the school district’s argument that excluding the religious group was necessary to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause because an “open access policy” is not “incompatible” with
the Clause).

MARCOSSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND TOLERANCE

4/17/2020 11:49 AM

149

In short, while most Establishment Clause cases focus on avoiding
an endorsement of religion,42 there is a significant thread in the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence stressing that government may not
disfavor religion, either. As the Court said in McCreary County, “[t]he
touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.’”43
B. Intolerance and Free Speech
In numerous ways, the Court’s interpretation of the Free Speech
Clause reflects the same principle that the religion cases do:
government actions which reflect intolerance by singling out unpopular
viewpoints are presumptively, if not automatically, unconstitutional.
Indeed, some of those cases involve religious speech.
The prior section discussed some of the cases involving religious
speech, such as Rosenberger and Lamb’s Chapel. Typically, those cases
are brought by plaintiffs alleging a violation of their right to free speech
because a government policy excluded their religious speech from a
forum.44 The Court has been resolute that attempts to exclude religious
speech constitute viewpoint-based discrimination, subject to strict
scrutiny analysis that is virtually always fatal.45 In doing so, the Court

42. See, e.g., McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (holding that the religious
content of a Ten Commandments display, and the openly expressed motivation of government
officials to promote religion in adopting it, violated the Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a policy promoting school prayer would be
seen by a reasonable observer as endorsing religion, violating Establishment Clause).
43. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 860 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
44. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (discussing the court of appeals’ determination of
student group’s free speech claim and noting that “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508
U.S. at 387 (noting that the issue in the case was whether “it violates the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment . . . to deny a church access to school premises” when access to those
facilities had been granted to other, non-religious community groups). As noted above, the
Establishment Clause was relevant in those cases because the governments asserted that avoiding
a violation of the Clause was a compelling interest, and that it was necessary to exclude religious
speakers from the fora they had created to serve that interest. See supra text accompanying notes
28–41.
45. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30 (discussing the distinction between content-based
exclusions and viewpoint-based exclusions in forum cases, because a content-based exclusion
“may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum,” whereas a viewpointbased exclusion “is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum’s limitations”); see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268–69 (finding that the University had created
an open forum by allowing student groups to use university facilities for meetings, and then
engaged in impermissible discrimination against religious speech by denying religious student
group access).
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has rejected the claim of some of its members that a policy excluding
religious speech across the board is content-based (i.e., based on
religious content as a category) rather than viewpoint-based.46 In
response to Justice Souter’s dissent in Rosenberger, Justice Kennedy
explained: “[t]he dissent’s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination
occurs because the Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of
[religious] viewpoints reflects an insupportable assumption that all
debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to
religious speech.”47
Intolerance of unpopular speech that translates into viewpointbased restrictions on that speech has been the subject of many of the
Court’s First Amendment decisions. Most recently, the Court in Iancu
v. Brunetti struck down a provision of the Lanham Act that prohibited
the registration of “immoral or scandalous” trademarks.48 In Iancu, the
trademark at issue was the term “FUCT” for a line of clothing.49 The
Patent and Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board found that the
mark was “‘highly offensive’ and ‘vulgar,’ and that it had ‘decidedly
negative sexual connotations.’”50 These conclusions formed the basis
for denying registration.51 The Court held—following on its decision
two years earlier in Matal v. Tam52—that it is only possible to judge what
46. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If the Guidelines were written
or applied so as to limit only such Christian advocacy and no other evangelical efforts that might
compete with it, the discrimination would be based on viewpoint. But that is not what the
regulation authorizes; it applies to Muslim and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to
Christian.”).
47. Id. at 831.
48. 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
49. Id. at 2297.
50. Id. at 2298 (quoting Pet. App. at 59a, 64a–65a).
51. Id.
52. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (quoting the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1502(a)) (striking
down a Lanham Act provision “prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . .
or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or dead’”). Justice Alito’s opinion
for the Court in Tam contained a fair amount of irony, since it relied on the proposition that the
government may not be intolerant towards speech it disagrees with because the First Amendment
protects intolerant speech. Indeed, the plurality explicitly characterized the viewpoint-based
restriction created by the Lanham Act’s “disparagement clause” by saying, “[g]iving offense is a
viewpoint.” Id. at 1763 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he disparagement clause the Government now seeks to
implement and enforce identifies the relevant subject as ‘persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Within that category, an applicant may register
a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one. The law thus reflects the Government’s
disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive. This is the essence of viewpoint
discrimination.”). But if there is irony there, it should not be all that surprising, since the speech
whose viewpoint is most likely to make it the target of government regulations is that which gives
offense to others, who then persuade the government to ban or discriminate against it. As the
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is immoral or scandalous by reference to those concepts as viewpoints.
Since the regulations were inherently based on the viewpoint reflected
in the mark, the Lanham Act ran afoul of the First Amendment’s
tolerance mandate.53
This was also the case in Texas v. Johnson, where the Court afforded
protection to the decidedly unpopular—and to many, offensive—
expressive conduct of burning the U.S. flag as a means of protest.54 In
short, the demands of tolerance extend to ideas or modes of expression
the majority finds repugnant. The fact that even a majority of the Court
might be loath to tolerate speech does not strip that speech of the First
Amendment’s protection. To the contrary, “[i]f there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”55
Just as the government must tolerate unpopular speech, it may not
compel those whose views are unpopular or outside the mainstream to
utter a government-approved message with which they disagree. The
Court’s landmark decision in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette established as much, striking down a West Virginia law
compelling school children to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance.56
The law was challenged by Jehovah’s Witnesses, who alleged that
reciting the pledge would violate their faith.57 In ruling against the state
law, the Court held:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and

Tam opinion noted: “We have said time and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.’” Id.
(quoting Street v. New York, 396 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)).
53. Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (“The government may not discriminate against speech based
on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”).
54. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
55. Id. at 414. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408 (1974) (striking down a state
statute “forbidding the exhibition of a United States flag to which is attached or superimposed
figures, symbols, or other extraneous material” as applied to a student who affixed a peace sign
to a flag to protest U.S. foreign policy and the Kent State massacre).
56. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
57. Id. at 629 (asserting the claim that reciting the pledge and saluting the flag would violate
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ reading of the Biblical prohibition of making a “graven image”).
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assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.58

When the government attempts to force someone to speak a
message that violates his or her actual beliefs, it is often because those
beliefs are out of the mainstream and unpopular. This is impermissible:
the government must respect the dissenter’s right to remain silent
rather than expressing the government’s preferred message.59
The theme of tolerance also emerges from the Court’s “heckler’s
veto” jurisprudence. In these cases, the Court has consistently held that
when a speaker’s views are met with a hostile response from his or her
audience, it is the government’s responsibility to protect the speaker,
rather than use its authority to censor or silence the message, which
would place the state’s power behind the hecklers who disapprove of
the speaker’s message.60 This principle was also applied in a series of
cases the Court decided which afforded protections to civil rights
activists in the 1960s.61 As Professor Brett Johnson explained:
All three cases involved groups of African-Americans who marched
on public property to protest segregation. In each case, the
protestors confronted large crowds of angry whites. In each case,
some protestors were arrested and charged with violating disorderly
conduct or breach of the peace statutes, with police officers
testifying that they made the arrests because the crowds were
growing restive and the protestors repeatedly disobeyed the

58. Id. at 638.
59. Id. at 642 (“But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
60. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (overturning disorderly conduct
conviction of a high-profile priest who delivered a racist, anti-Semitic speech that incited a hostile
reaction from his audience, because speech that is “provocative and challenging” is protected
speech, even if it has “profound unsettling effects”).
61. See generally Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111–12 (1969) (reversing disorderly
conduct convictions of fair housing demonstrators where there was no evidence they were
disorderly, and it was hostile onlookers who had become unruly); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
538–39 (1965) (reversing defendant’s convictions for disturbing the peace, obstructing public
passage, and picketing before a courthouse struck down as a violation of his free speech rights,
where he had been leading and speaking at a mass demonstration to protest segregation and
earlier arrests of other leaders); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235–36 (1963)
(overturning demonstrators’ convictions for breach of the peace during their protest at the state
house, where they were merely exercising core constitutional rights of speech and peaceable
assembly).

MARCOSSON FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

4/17/2020 11:49 AM

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP AND TOLERANCE

153

officers’ orders to disperse. In each case, the African-American
protestors prevailed.62

Those cases lie at the intersection of the Constitution’s requirement
for tolerance under the First Amendment—since they protect
unpopular expression from being silenced by intolerance—and under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—since the
specific context involved protecting those protesting against
segregation from intolerant racism.
C. Intolerance and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Bare Desire to
Harm
At the heart of the Equal Protection Clause is the notion that the
government may not give private prejudices the force of law nor subject
any individual or group to discriminatory treatment based on
intolerance. Putting aside the question of whether the government has
a further obligation to eradicate private bias and intolerance, it
certainly cannot enact them into law by acting on the “bare desire to
harm” an unpopular group.63
Perhaps the Court’s clearest explication of this principle came in
Palmore v. Sidoti,64 where state courts in Florida had taken racial
prejudice into consideration in modifying a custody decree based on
changed circumstances.65 Essentially, the state courts decided to
remove a child from the mother and give custody to the father, at least
in part because the courts were concerned that the mother’s interracial
relationship would subject the child to race-based private bigotry.66 The
Court emphatically made clear that merely because racial prejudice
exists in the world does not mean that the government can give it legal
effect:
It would ignore reality to suggest that racial and ethnic prejudices
do not exist or that all manifestations of those prejudices have been
eliminated. There is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of a
62. Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence
to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y
175, 186–87 (2016).
63. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
64. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id. at 430–31 (noting that the father sought modification because “the child’s mother was
then cohabiting with a Negro,” and the family court found “that despite the strides that have been
made in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, if
allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus [becomes] more
vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that is sure to come”).
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different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses
not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or
ethnic origin.
The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases and
the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations
for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.
We have little difficulty concluding that they are not. The
Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it
tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of the law,
but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.67

More than 60 years earlier, the Court had relied on nearly identical
reasoning in striking down a Louisville ordinance that—like the state
court’s decision in Palmore—gave legal effect to private prejudice. In
Buchanan v. Worley, the racial intolerance the Court confronted took
the form of popular opinion favoring residential segregation.68 The
ordinance “made [it] unlawful for any colored person to move into and
occupy as a residence . . . any house upon any block upon which a
greater number of houses are occupied as residences . . . by white
people than are occupied as residences . . . by colored people.”69 As the
Court aptly noted:
[T]his interdiction is based wholly upon color; simply that and
nothing more. In effect, premises situated as are those in question in
the so-called white block are effectively debarred from sale to
persons of color, because if sold they cannot be occupied by the
purchaser nor by him sold to another of the same color.70

The law was defended on the ground that it would “promote the
public peace by preventing racial conflict”71—giving legal effect to
private prejudice that favored segregating people by race. As the Court
explained in striking down the law,
[t]hat there exists a serious and difficult problem arising from a
feeling of race hostility which the law is powerless to control, and to
which it must give a measure of consideration, may be freely
admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by depriving citizens
of their constitutional rights and privileges.72

67. Id. at 433 (footnote omitted).
68. Buchanan v. Worley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
69. Id. at 70–71. The ordinance also contained a reciprocal section, barring whites from
occupying a residence on a block where there were more black residents than white. Id. at 71.
70. Id. at 73.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 80–81. It is ironic that in the period during which Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
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The same core anti-animus principle was at the heart of each of the
Court’s decisions over the last 25 years in cases dealing with claims that
government actors discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. The
context differed, since the intolerance in the earlier cases involved
private racial prejudice and the issue was whether government could
give it effect, while the focus in the sexual orientation cases has been
the government’s own animosity. But this is a blurry line at best, since
intolerance by a legislature may be a function of both the actual
personal intolerance of its members, their beliefs about the intolerance
of the members of the public who elected them, or some combination
of both. Ultimately, the principle that government may not give legal
effect to intolerance is the same. In the sexual orientation context, the
expression of that idea began with the critical 1996 decision in Romer
v. Evans.73 Since then, the Court’s decisions have indicated a consistent
theme that animosity towards sexual minorities is not a permissible
basis for government actions. These have included striking down a state
constitutional amendment stripping gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals of
protections under state and local antidiscrimination laws and barring
the enactment of such laws in the future,74 a same-sex sodomy law,75 the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) denying recognition under
federal law to same-sex couples’ marriages valid under state law,76 and
state laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying or having their
out-of-state marriages recognized.77

(1896), was ascendant, and the state itself could maintain segregated facilities and require
segregation in public accommodations, the Court drew the line at allowing racial prejudice to be
the basis on which the state could infringe right of private parties to enter into an otherwise valid
contract to convey property.
73. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
74. Id. at 634–35 (explaining why animosity was the underlying basis for Amendment 2, and
why this cannot be a legitimate government interest sufficient even to satisfy rational basis
scrutiny); see also David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification:
An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 491, 510 (1994) (prior to Romer, proposing an anti-intolerance theory as the basis for
overturning anti-gay ballot initiatives and arguing, “[t]he traditional moral condemnation of
homosexuality was, in its historical nature, a form of intolerance that should have been subject to
appropriate political and constitutional assessment in light of the argument for toleration”).
75. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (criticizing the Court’s 1986 decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as imposing a particular moral code disapproving of
homosexual conduct).
76. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013) (striking down Section 3 of
DOMA using the animus principle of Romer because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought
to protect in personhood and dignity”).
77. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (noting that state laws denying
recognition to same-sex marriages must be measured “against a long history of disapproval of
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The Romer/Obergefell line of cases has its roots in equal protection
decisions that had nothing to do with sexual orientation discrimination.
The Court has long held that animus towards an unpopular group—
intolerance by another name—does not constitute a legitimate
government interest sufficient to satisfy even the lowest level of
constitutional inquiry, rational basis scrutiny. As the Court stated in
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno:
[I]f the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws”
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.78

The marriage decisions are critical to understanding the Court’s
abiding concern with tolerance as a central constitutional virtue. For its
part, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Windsor pointed to
anti-gay statements in the congressional record surrounding DOMA as
particular evidence of unacceptable intolerance:
The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate
that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a
dignity conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign
power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It
was its essence. The House Report announced its conclusion that “it
is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to
defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage . . . . H.R.
3396 is appropriately entitled the ‘Defense of Marriage Act.’ The
effort to redefine ‘marriage’ to extend to homosexual couples is a
truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution
of marriage.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, pp. 12–13 (1996). The House
concluded that DOMA expresses “both moral disapproval of
homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better
comports with traditional (especially Judeo–Christian) morality.”79

Obergefell demonstrates the extent to which the Court stresses
tolerance by reference not to intolerance of same-sex marriage, but by
observing that the competing perspective of those who hew to the
traditionalist view of marriage must also be tolerated. Of course, the
Court’s primary focus in Obergefell was on the importance of marriage

their relationships,” and in that light, the “denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works
a grave and continuing harm”).
78. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). The Court cited this aspect of Moreno in Romer, 517 U.S. at
634–35, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring), and Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770.
79. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770–71 (citation omitted).
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as a fundamental right80 and of extending this right on an equal basis to
same-sex couples.81 But the Court suggested that although contrary
views may not be the basis for government policy restricting marriage,
they are owed tolerance and must be considered in the constitutional
analysis:
[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths,
and to their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure they
have long revered. The same is true of those who oppose same-sex
marriage for other reasons.82

Of course, the Court did not go into detail about the protections the
First Amendment provides for those with religious beliefs that reject
the validity of same-sex marriage. Such a discussion would have been
far beyond the scope of the issues presented in the case. But the clear
implication was that the Constitution requires some tolerance for such
private views, even in a world where state and federal governments
must recognize marriages that some private actors might oppose.
Obergefell did not need to tell us precisely where the constitutional line
is between requiring equal recognition of same-sex marriages and
tolerating dissenting views, but it told us that such a line exists, and that
the Court anticipated having to define and police it in future cases.
This should not have come as a surprise. The Court’s 2000 decision
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale83 came 15 years before Obergefell, and
established the premise that private anti-gay views are constitutionally
protected—in that case, by the First Amendment right of expressive
association84—and can be asserted to avoid the requirement that
private individuals or groups with such views refrain from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.
80. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (discussing the fundamental nature of marriage and the
rights it affords).
81. Id. at 2603 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978), for the proposition that
if the state unequally burdens a fundamental right, the equal protection violation is more
pronounced).
82. Id. at 2607 (emphasis added).
83. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
84. Id. at 648 (“The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the
group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”).
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Dale was that the Court
never actually discussed whether the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination was necessary to serve a compelling interest, either on
its face or as applied in the specific context of the ban on sexual
orientation discrimination and to the Boy Scouts in particular.85 This
omission was particularly striking because the majority recognized that
the right of expressive association is not absolute, and that a state may
burden it in the service of a compelling interest.86
The closest the Court came to actually discussing what should have
been a key aspect of its constitutional analysis was to observe that in
prior cases it had found that anti-discrimination laws serve a
compelling purpose when they bar sex discrimination,87 but that those
cases were inapposite because the laws at issue were found not to
“materially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to
express.”88 Of course, that is a distinction. Its significance should have
been that, once the Court concluded that the New Jersey law at issue
in Dale did “materially interfere” with the expression of the Boy Scouts,
the Court would then apply strict scrutiny to the law and its application.
That, after all, is what the Court did in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.89
Instead, this was the entirety of the Court’s “analysis” of this point:
The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public
accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the
Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association. That being
the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law.90

85. Id. at 653–56 (determining that application of the New Jersey law would “significantly
burden” the Boy Scouts’ views, and then finding this sufficient to violate the First Amendment
without any inquiry into the government’s interest and the narrow tailoring of the law).
86. Id. at 648 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (“[T]he
freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute. We have held that the
freedom could be overridden ‘by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms.’”).
87. Id. at 657 (“We recognized in cases such as Roberts and Duarte that States have a
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women in public accommodations.”).
88. Id.
89. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628–29 (noting that even if Minnesota’s anti-discrimination law
caused “some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees’ protected speech,” the law was
constitutional because it “abridge[d] no more speech or associational freedom than is necessary
to accomplish that purpose”).
90. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
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The Court substituted bald assertion for analysis, simply declaring
that New Jersey’s interests “d[id] not justify” the “intrusion.”91 The
Court never said whether its holding was limited to the law’s coverage
of sexual orientation, and thus that the case would have come out
differently if the Boy Scouts had sought to discriminate on the basis of
race, sex, or religion, or whether it was because the organizational
nature of the Scouts themselves gave them greater rights than other
places of public accommodation might enjoy. Either way, it was an
extraordinary example of the Court requiring that a government
tolerate positions it disagreed with, to the point of not even applying
the test that would ordinarily give that government an opportunity to
justify regulating the expression of that position.
Such a departure from the normal framework for evaluating First
Amendment cases is a clear sign of the Court’s determination to create
and maintain a clear constitutional space in which anti-gay views must
be tolerated, even in an era of growing constitutional protections for
LGBTQ rights. The exact same Justices who decided Romer and
Lawrence decided Dale. It was (and remains, despite changes in
membership) a Court that demands equality for LGBTQ Americans
but at the same time insists on tolerance of private views that differ.
D. Intolerance and Masterpiece Cakeshop
It is against this backdrop that the Court’s decision and reasoning
in Masterpiece Cakeshop can best be understood. Importantly, the
Court did not broadly hold that state and local anti-discrimination laws
violate the free exercise and free speech rights of business owners
whose religious convictions impel them to discriminate, as the
petitioners and some of their amici urged.92 Indeed, the Court was quite
explicit that the “general rule” is that religious views do not permit
those who hold them to violate public accommodations laws:
Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections [to
same-sex marriage] are protected, it is a general rule that such

91. Id.
92. See Opening Brief of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., et al. at 16–46, Masterpiece Cakeshop
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018) (No. 16-111) (arguing that
applying the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) to require the bakery to supply a
wedding cake for a same-sex couple would constitute compelled speech and impermissibly
infringe on their religious freedom); Brief of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the
Southern Baptist Convention, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22–25, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (arguing that CADA operates as a “de facto religious
test” and thus a per se violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
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objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to
goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public
accommodations law.93

Instead, the Court held that it was how the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission had enforced the law that rendered its treatment of
Masterpiece Cakeshop unconstitutional. As Justice Kennedy’s opinion
framed the state’s failure, “Phillips [the owner and operator of
Masterpiece Cakeshop] was entitled to the neutral and respectful
consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case . . . .
[But t]he Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere
religious beliefs that motivated his objection.”94 In other words, the
Commission’s intolerance of the religious views of Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s owner, which was exhibited by commissioners at public
hearings, rendered the Commission’s holding unconstitutional.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that some of the statements made
by the Commissioners were susceptible of interpretations that did not
indicate anti-religious bias.95 Nevertheless, the Court found that others
more explicitly referenced religion in a way that was unacceptable. For
example, one commissioner stated at a hearing on July 25, 2014:
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify
all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to
justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to
hurt others.”96

93. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727; see also id. at 1728–29 (“[A]ny decision in favor
of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services
who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs
saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,’ something that
would impose a serious stigma on gay persons.”).
94. Id. at 1729.
95. Id. (discussing statements made at a May 30, 2014 meeting, stating: “Standing alone,
these statements are susceptible of different interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean
simply that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of
the proprietor’s personal views.”).
96. Id.
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In the Court’s view, this was an example of government intolerance
in the enforcement of the law:
To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use” is to disparage his religion in at least
two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by
characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial and
even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to compare
Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses
of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is inappropriate for a
Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and
neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law
that protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well
as sexual orientation.97

The Court found further evidence of anti-religious intolerance in
the Commission’s differential treatment of discrimination claims where
bakers had refused to serve customers based on non-religious
objections to the messages on the cakes. In those instances, the
requested cakes expressed anti-gay marriage sentiments, and the
Commission rejected the claims that the bakers’ refusals to fill the
orders were discriminatory.98 As a result, “the Commission’s
consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did not accord with its
treatment of these other objections,”99 and “the Commission’s
treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First
Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or
religious viewpoint.”100
In short, the Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop sounded in
the tolerance theme that has long been common to its constitutional
jurisprudence.101 Intolerance of unpopular views cannot be the basis of
97. Id. The Court found the remarks unquestionably relevant, since they “were made . . . by
an adjudicatory body deciding a particular case.” Id. at 1730. It was thus able to avoid wrestling
with the question of whether similar comments would have been relevant to the Court’s
discrimination analysis if they had been made by a legislator during the law’s enactment—an issue
on which “[m]embers of the Court have disagreed.” Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–42 (1993)); Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). This will be the focus of Section III, infra.
98. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1731.
101. Justice Kagan’s separate concurrence, joined by Justice Breyer, also relied on the
conclusion that the facts suggested religious intolerance was at play in the Commission’s actions,
but she added a further justification. She was troubled that the Commission failed to utilize what
she believed was a clear and simple basis for rejecting the claims of anti-gay customers, while still
finding that Masterpiece had discriminated. Id. at 1733–34 (arguing that the bakers who rejected
the anti-gay customers did not, in fact, discriminate because they would have treated anyone
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governmental decision-making without running afoul of constitutional
protections contained in the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
II. FROM ENFORCEMENT TO ENACTMENT: APPLYING THE
TOLERANCE MANDATE TO LEGISLATIVE ACTION
As noted above, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop pointedly left open a key question: whether CADA’s
hostility towards religion would have also been constitutionally
impermissible had it been expressed by members of the legislature that
enacted the law, rather than the executive agency charged with
enforcing it. Kennedy wrote:
Members of the Court have disagreed on the question whether
statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into account
in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the
basis of religion . . . . In this case, however, the remarks were made
in a very different context—by an adjudicatory body deciding a
particular case.102

The disagreement Justice Kennedy alluded to in Masterpiece
Cakeshop was between himself and Justice Scalia in Church of Lakumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.103 Although most of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion was for a majority, one section was not; there, he
wrote only for himself and Justice Stevens. He wrote:
Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and
the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous
statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.104

In Hialeah, Justice Kennedy found abundant proof of
impermissible legislative intolerance towards the Santeria religion that
the ordinance singled out. “The minutes and taped excerpts of the June
9 session, both of which are in the record,” he wrote, “evidence
significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council,

asking for a cake with those messages the same, while Masterpiece Cakeshop did discriminate
because it was willing to prepare wedding cakes for opposite-sex couples, but not same-sex
couples). Justice Kagan’s view suggested the Commission could have found for the claimants—
simply not on the basis of the hostility to religion that infected its analysis.
102. Id. at 1730 (citations omitted).
103. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
104. Id. at 540 (plurality opinion) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977)) (emphasis added).
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and other city officials toward the Santeria religion.”105 He proceeded
to give several examples of anti-Santeria comments made by members
of the Hialeah City Council.106
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, did not believe such comments
were relevant to the question of whether a law discriminates against
religion. He argued this question should be answered based on the
content of the law itself.107 His position was stated best in this passage:
The First Amendment does not refer to the purposes for which
legislators enact laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted:
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] . . . .” This does not put us in the business of invalidating
laws by reason of the evil motives of their authors. Had the Hialeah
City Council set out resolutely to suppress the practices of Santeria,
but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do not see how
those laws could be said to “prohibi[t] the free exercise” of religion.
Nor, in my view, does it matter that a legislature consists entirely of
the pure-hearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious
practice for special burdens.108

In light of this disagreement, it may be unclear whether antireligious motives expressed by legislators are relevant to a law’s
constitutionality.109 But the better answer is that they are, in fact,
critical. To see why, consider the mirror image case: situations where
legislators express pro-religious views as the motive for their decisions.
In McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky,110 the Court held that government officials’ pro-religious
purpose was relevant to deciding whether their action—posting the Ten
Commandments—violated the Establishment Clause.111 The Petitioner
105. Id. at 541.
106. Id. at 541–42.
107. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I do not join
[Section II(A)(2)] because it departs from the opinion’s general focus on the object of the laws at
issue to consider the subjective motivation of the lawmakers, i.e., whether the Hialeah City
Council actually intended to disfavor the religion of Santeria. As I have noted elsewhere, it is
virtually impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective legislative body . . . and this
Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries.” (citations omitted and emphasis in
original)).
108. Id. at 558–59.
109. See Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMM. 171,
177 (2019) (discussing the question of whether evidence of religious intolerance by an
administrative body has the same effect in the constitutional inquiry as such evidence by a
legislature).
110. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
111. Id. at 861–62 (“Examination of purpose is a staple of statutory interpretation that makes
up the daily fare of every appellate court in the country . . . and governmental purpose is a key
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counties argued—as Justice Scalia had in his Hialeah concurrence112—
that legislative purpose is essentially unknowable.113 The Court noted
that while in some instances “the government action itself bespoke the
purpose,”114 in others the Court has “relied on a statute’s text and the
detailed public comments of its sponsor, when [it] sought the purpose
of a state law requiring creationism to be taught alongside
evolution.”115 Thus, the Court has found that legislative purpose is
indeed knowable, that it can be discerned from the statements of
supportive legislators, and that it can render the government’s actions
a violation of the Establishment Clause.116
element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine.” (citations omitted)). It is true that the Supreme
Court has shifted its views on Establishment Clause matters since McCreary County, but if
anything there are indications that the Court is likely to place more emphasis on the government’s
purpose in finding violations of the Establishment Clause, rather than less. In OT 2019, the Court
is considering Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, No. 18-1195, which raises the issue
of the constitutionality of a school vouchers program that excludes religious schools. At oral
argument, Justice Alito suggested that the state would violate the Establishment Clause if it does
something for an unconstitutional reason, even if it is doing something it could constitutionally
do for a good reason. Official Oral Argument Transcript, Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue, No. 18-1195, at 18, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2019/18-1195_g314.pdf. See also id. at 43–44 (Justice Kavanaugh discussing the
question of whether provisions like Montana’s barring aid to religious schools were “rooted in—
in grotesque religious bigotry against Catholics” and opining that “was the clear motivation for
this”).
112. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“As I have noted elsewhere, it is virtually impossible to determine the singular “motive” of a
collective legislative body . . . .”).
113. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 861 (“Their first argument is that the very consideration of
purpose is deceptive: according to them, true “purpose” is unknowable, and its search merely an
excuse for courts to act selectively and unpredictably in picking out evidence of subjective
intent.”).
114. Id. at 862 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223–24
(1963)).
115. Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–88 (1987)).
116. See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (upholding lower court findings that a
county’s at-large voting for its Board of Commissioners was maintained with a discriminatory
intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and rejecting Justice Stevens’s argument in
dissent that it should not consider the subjective intent of government officials in enacting
policies). Many of the Justices have eschewed the use of legislative history in recent years,
following Justice Scalia’s lead and his criticisms of the validity of legislative history. See, e.g.,
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97–100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). That critique is strongest against the indiscriminate use of committee reports
which may only loosely, if at all, reflect Congress’ intent. Id. at 98–99 (“As anyone familiar with
modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases
were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at worst by a
committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those
references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant . . . but
rather to influence judicial construction.”). On the other hand, when actual statements of
legislators support the conclusion that they acted on the basis of animus or intolerance, that
history is powerfully relevant to any constitutional inquiry in which discriminatory purpose is the
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Legislative purpose has, of course, been an explicit prong of the
Court’s Establishment Clause test for decades: under Lemon v.
Kurtzman, a government action must “have a secular legislative
purpose.”117 And even under the “endorsement” test that the Court has
sometimes employed in lieu of (or as a supplement to) Lemon,118 the
Court investigates purpose as a key part of determining whether a
“reasonable observer” would perceive the government action to be an
endorsement of religion.119 If it is possible to discern legislative purpose
and make it the basis for Establishment Clause decisions, there is no
reason it cannot be done so when the claim revolves around the Free
Exercise or Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.
The Court has made purpose analytically significant even in areas
of constitutional law where it is not an explicit prong of a test. For
example, a state’s purpose to provide advantages to its own businesses
over out-of-state entities can be the basis for declaring its actions a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.120 And in Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine, a finding of discriminatory purpose is required
for a plaintiff to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, as
disparate impact alone is not enough.121
Thus, there is substantial support for the proposition that a
legislature’s illegitimate purpose is either central or at least relevant to
constitutional decision-making.122 Since religious intolerance voiced
focus, including—as discussed earlier—viewpoint-based discrimination under the First
Amendment, endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause, or racial or other bigotry
under the Equal Protection Clause.
117. 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
118. See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989)
(“In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has
long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”), abrogated in part, Town of Greece
v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 579–80 (2011).
119. Id. at 630 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defending the endorsement test as workable in
practice in part because of its reference to whether a reasonable observer would find that the
government action endorses or favors one religion).
120. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977) (noting
that, while it was unnecessary to decide whether a North Carolina statute that discriminated
against Washington apples was enacted with a discriminatory purpose, there were “indications in
the record” that the statute’s “discriminatory impact on interstate commerce was not an
unintended byproduct” but actually the state’s purpose).
121. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
122. Although it did not involve a legislature’s actions, the same basic principle was also on
display in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down a voter-passed initiative as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). As I discussed earlier, a central feature of the Court’s
analysis was that Amendment 2 was motivated by animus, a conclusion that the Court based on
how “discontinuous” Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth” was with the reasons offered for it.
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and acted upon by members of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission
was critical to the constitutionality of the Commission’s actions, similar
intolerance should also be relevant to the constitutionality of legislative
action. The question that remains is what is necessary to insulate a law
from being struck down because of anti-religious hostility on the part
of some or all of the members of the legislature.
III. A MODEL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: HOW COMPROMISE TILTS
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Given that courts should consider legislative purpose when
assessing a law’s constitutionality, legislators must be aware of potential
scrutiny when drafting anti-discrimination laws.123 Of course, the
simplest piece of advice for a legislature aiming to protect its
handiwork from accusations of anti-religious intolerance is not to
engage in anti-religious intolerance. Explicit comments manifesting
hostility to religion are the most direct evidence that a court would use
to find forbidden motives.
But that is not the end of the story. The safest harbor for an antidiscrimination law comes from taking steps in the legislative process to
affirmatively show respect for religious views. Two legislatures have
provided prevalent examples as to how this might look: Utah in 2015
when it attempted to provide statewide protection against housing and
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity, and Kentucky attempting to do the same in 2019.
Before embarking on that discussion, it is worth pausing to
acknowledge that some supporters of LGBTQ rights, and of the laws
that seek to protect them, have questioned the legitimacy of religious
objections and argued that the Court was wrong in Masterpiece
Cakeshop to give any currency to religious beliefs that would consign
sexual minorities to unequal status.124 While I am sympathetic to this

123. It is worth noting that even if Justice Scalia’s objection in Hialeah to looking at legislative
purpose has merit and may lead some courts to disregard purpose and instead look only at
whether a statute discriminates on its face, it would still be prudent for legislators to avoid creating
a legislative record that demonstrates anti-religious animus. After all, they cannot be certain what
judges will deem relevant in a challenge to a statute, and there is little, if any, reason to take the
risk that anti-religious statements in the legislative history will have the same effect they did in
Masterpiece Cakeshop.
124. See Stephen M. Feldman, Having Your Case And Eating It Too? Religious Freedom and
LGBTQ Rights, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 35, 38–39 (2018) (“[D]iscrimination against a
marginalized group or its members, such as LGBTQ individuals, inevitably undermines the
standing of that group and its members in the political community. Therefore, discrimination
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argument, it is clear that the Supreme Court majority is not. The Court
interprets the Constitution to require that governments balance
competing equality and religious liberty interests in a way that avoids
religious intolerance. In other words, religious beliefs and practices—
even anti-gay ones—are worthy of constitutional protection. This is
precisely because they are religious, and religion holds status as a
constitutional value expressed in the Free Exercise Clause.125 In short,
compromise is a constitutional imperative.
A. The “Utah Collaboration”: Finding a Compromise Between AntiDiscrimination Norms and Religious Values
In 2015, the Utah Legislature passed SB 296, which added
protections for sexual orientation and gender identity to the state’s
existing Antidiscrimination and Fair Housing Acts.126 The passage of SB
296 was the culmination of work undertaken by the LGBT advocacy
group Equality Utah, which in 2004 became principally responsible
within the statewide organizational structure for “draft[ing] legislation
and coordinat[ing] lobby efforts to ensure its passage.”127 The outcome
came as a surprise to some given the landscape in Utah and elsewhere.
Utah is one of the most conservative states in the country, with a
Republican-dominated legislature.128 Nationwide, 2015 was dominated

against same-sex couples and LGBTQ individuals, even if arising from religious beliefs, cannot
be deemed of constitutional value.”).
125. See Sam Marcosson, The Special Status of Religion Under the First Amendment . . . And
What It Means For Gay Rights and Antidiscrimination Laws, in MORAL ARGUMENT, RELIGION,
& SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 135–36 (Gordon A. Bapst, et al., eds., 2009) (arguing that “religious
arguments are special in our discourse,” because the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
serve a “constitutive function—defining the core values and shared assumptions that govern the
ways in which we related to each other”).
126. Section 5, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-106(a)(i)(I & J) (West 2019) (amending UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A-5-101 (West 2019)); see
Nondiscrimination, EQUALITY UTAH, https://www.equalityutah.org/issues/nondiscrimination
(“On March 12, 2015, Governor Herbert signed SB 296 into law. This milestone legislation added
the words ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ to Utah’s Anti-Discrimination and Fair
Housing Acts, which has helped protect LGBTQ Utahns against discrimination at work and in
the housing market.”).
127. See Mission and Vision, EQUALITY UTAH, https://www.equalityutah.org/about/missionand-vision.
128. See Mark Saal, One Year Later, Utah LGBT Anti-discrimination Law Continues to
Resonate, OGDEN STANDARD-EXAMINER (June 17, 2016), https://www.standard.net/news/oneyear-later-utah-lgbt-anti-discrimination-law-continues-to/article_a69fb281-1757-52c7-97baa20e3
87fca07.html (quoting State Senator Stuart Adams noting that “it’s no secret” Republicans hold
87 of 104 seats in the Utah Legislature).
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by “anti-gay” bills in state legislatures rather than “pro-gay” ones.129 As
a result, “Troy Williams [the Executive Director of Equality Utah]
likened [the bill] to an earthquake. [State Senator] Stuart Adams called
it nothing short of a miracle.”130
This feat required, more than anything, a deliberate strategy of
compromise on the key question of how to balance protection from
housing and employment discrimination against the religious tenets of
some employers and housing providers.131 This was a particularly
sensitive issue because of the Mormon Church’s political influence in
Utah132—specifically, its involvement in the debates over SB 296.133
To strike this balance, SB 296 included sections that carved out
exemptions for religious reasons and Boy Scout troops, protected
religious expression, carefully compromised on transgender rights, and
provided for non-severability. First, Section 1(i)(ii) was the most direct
nod towards ensuring that the bill would not infringe on protected
religious liberty interests. This section exempted from the definition of
“employer” any “religious corporation sole, a religious association, a
religious society, a religious educational institution, or a religious

129. Id. (“Troy Williams, executive director of the LGBT rights group Equality Utah, says
the measure was the only ‘pro-LGBT’ bill of 2015, while there were 80 bills he described as ‘antiLGBT’ proposed throughout the country.”).
130. Id.
131. One element of compromise was built into the scope of SB 296 itself: it covered housing
and employment, but not public accommodations. See LGBT Non-Discrimination in the States:
Utah, FREEDOM FOR ALL AMERICANS, https://www.freedomforallamericans.org/category/
states/ut/ (“Since 2015, Utah has protected people from discrimination in housing and
employment on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. However, these nondiscrimination laws do not cover public accommodations.”).
132. See Lee Davidson, Who Has a Bigger Supermajority Than Even Republicans in Utah’s
Legislature? Latter-day Saints, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/
politics/2019/01/21/who-has-bigger/ (“Nine of every 10 legislators are members of The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.”). LDS members had an overwhelming 91–13 majority of LDS
members in the Legislature beginning in 2019, but in fact that represented an increase by one of
the number of non-LDS members who had been in the Legislature as of 2016. Id. By any measure,
the LDS influence in the Utah Legislature is vast.
133. See Saal, supra note 128 (“A common criticism is that the LDS Church is too involved
with the political process in Utah. Although Adams insists the church rarely gets directly involved
with the laws in the state, he said this anti-discrimination law was a notable exception.”); Michelle
L. Price, Mormon Church Backs Utah LGBT Anti-Discrimination Bill, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 5,
2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/03/04/mormon-church-backs-utah-lgbtanti-discrimination-bill/t4WJzYlHWo1JR0cdQ61gxJ/amp.html (“Utah lawmakers introduced a
landmark bill Wednesday that bars housing or workplace discrimination against gay and
transgender individuals, while protecting the rights of religious groups and individuals. The
measure has a rare stamp of approval from the Mormon church and appears likely to pass in Utah,
where the church is based and many state lawmakers and the Republican governor are members
of the faith.”).
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leader, when that individual is acting in the capacity of a religious
leader.”134
Second, SB 296 also exempted the Boy Scouts,135 who at the time
banned gay Scout leaders.136 The decades-long importance of the Boy
Scouts to the LDS Church, certainly up to and including 2015, can
hardly be overstated.137 It was a priority for the legislature to ensure
that any statewide antidiscrimination law would not be used to upset
the ability of the Scouts to operate or compel the organization to
change its policies—as shown by the fact that when the Scouts did later
eliminate the ban, the LDS ended its more than 100 year old affiliation
with the Scouts.138
In perhaps the clearest demonstration of the Legislature’s
solicitude for religion, SB 296 went out of its way to protect the
expression of religious views in the workplace. It did so in two ways,
one more significant than the other. Section 9 stated, “This chapter may
not be interpreted to infringe upon the freedom of expressive
association or the free exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections
1, 4, and 15 of the Utah Constitution.”139 This provision is largely
symbolic, since if anything in the chapter did infringe on
constitutionally protected free exercise of religion, it would be struck
down on that basis or interpreted to avoid the constitutional infirmity.
Either way, the infringement would not occur.
Section 10, however, was more meaningful and provided deep
protection for religious expression both inside and outside the
134. Section 1, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-102(1)(i)(ii)(A) (West 2019).
135. Section 1, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-102(1)(i)(ii)(C) (West 2019).
136. Price, supra note 133 (“Religious groups would be exempt . . . as would Boy Scouts of
America, which has a ban on gay adult Scout leaders.”).
137. See Laurie Goodstein and Christine Hauser, Mormon Church Ends Century-Old
Partnership With Boy Scouts of America, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/09/us/boy-scouts-mormon-church.html (“The Mormon Church and the Boy Scouts of
America formed a partnership 105 years ago based on shared beliefs in God, country and the
necessity of teaching morals and responsibility to boys. The groups became so intertwined that
one of every five Boy Scouts in the United States is Mormon, and all Mormon boys were expected
to participate in scouting.”).
138. Id. (describing LDS’s decision to “sever[] ties with the Boy Scouts and . . . design its own
youth programs that could be implemented in its congregations around the world,” in part
because “the two organizations . . . had begun charting different paths,” including LDS
disagreement with “the Boy Scouts . . . end[ing] its ban on openly gay adult leaders”).
139. Section 9, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-111 (West 2019).
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workplace. The first part of Section 10 guaranteed a worker the right to
“express [his or her] religious or moral beliefs and commitments in the
workplace in a reasonable, non-disruptive, and non-harassing way on
equal terms with similar types of expression of beliefs or commitments
allowed by the employer in the workplace.”140 The second part of
Section 10 was even more striking: it barred employers from taking
adverse employment actions against employees or applicants for their
“lawful expression or expressive activity outside of the workplace
regarding the person’s religious, political, or personal convictions,
including convictions about marriage, family, or sexuality, unless the
expression or expressive activity is in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer.”141 The Utah legislature was
deeply committed to protecting workers with religious beliefs that may
differ from the employer’s, including, for example, opposition to
marriage equality, whether the expression of those beliefs came within
or out of the workplace.
Next, Sections 7 and 8 added provisions that gave employers leeway
in structuring their workplace policies, which some would exercise in
fulfillment of their religious scruples. Section 7 provided:
This chapter may not be interpreted to prohibit an employer from
adopting reasonable dress and grooming standards not prohibited
by other provisions of federal or state law, provided that the
employer’s dress and grooming standards afford reasonable
accommodations based on gender identity to all employees.142

This was a carefully drawn compromise on an issue that has been a
lightning rod when it comes to discrimination based on gender identity:
whether an employer may prohibit or strictly limit a transgender
employee’s ability to transition by presenting him or herself in clothing
and grooming manners that conform to their gender.143 This provision
was not as favorable from the transgender employee’s point of view as
provisions like California’s, which states:

140. Section 10, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, § 34A5-112(1) (West 2019).
141. Id. § 34A-5-112(2) (emphasis added).
142. Section 7, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, § 34A5-109 (West 2019).
143. See Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections For the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title
VII’s Prohibition on Sex Discrimination, the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and the
Prospect of ENDA, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1367–72 (2014) (discussing parallel, though not
identical, language in the proposed federal Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA) to
balance right to gender expression against permitting employer grooming and dress policies).
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Nothing in this part relating to gender-based discrimination affects
the ability of an employer to require an employee to adhere to
reasonable workplace appearance, grooming, and dress standards
not precluded by other provisions of state or federal law, provided
that an employer shall allow an employee to appear or dress
consistently with the employee’s gender identity or gender
expression.144

While both the Utah and California laws permit employers to
enforce appearance requirements, California’s gives employees the
explicit right to “appear or dress consistently with the employee’s
gender identity or expression,” while Utah’s provides only the more
ambiguous right to a reasonable accommodation. In this way, Section 7
struck a balance that achieved as much as the LGBTQ coalition
believed it could realistically attain while satisfying the objections of
those who either favored employer prerogatives or had concerns about
permitting freedom of gender expression in the workplace.145
Section 8 struck a similar balance on another controversial issue in
the debate over transgender rights: restrooms. It provided:
This chapter may not be interpreted to prohibit an employer from
adopting reasonable rules and policies that designate sex-specific
facilities, including restrooms, shower facilities, and dressing

144. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12949 (West 2019).
145. The “reasonable accommodation” provision mirrors the language used in the federal
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (defining “discrimination
on the basis of disability” to include “not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”).
Although it cannot be said with certainty that the language in the Utah law would be applied in
the same way it has under the ADA, the fact that parallel language is used in similar statutory
schemes (anti-discrimination laws) suggests that outcomes under the ADA provide some clues
about how these provisions would be interpreted in Utah and elsewhere. In particular, it suggests
that Section 7 will provide meaningful opportunity for employees to claim that they have been
denied accommodations from otherwise permissible dress and grooming standards, but that their
success will come more through negotiating with employers to reach agreed-upon compromises
than through litigation. See Sharona Hoffman, Settling The Matter: Does Title I of the ADA
Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 327 (2008) (noting that the extreme lack of success for plaintiffs in
ADA cases may occur because “judges are simply uncomfortable placing such [accommodation]
demands on employers, and, therefore, rarely rule in the plaintiffs’ favor”); id. at 334–36
(reporting on studies showing that employers often provide accommodations without any dispute
or as part of conciliation process). This, in turn, indicates that the Utah compromise is just that: a
compromise that will allow both religious employers and employees who seek accommodations
for their gender identity and expression to have substantial opportunities to have their interests
considered. In short, there is nothing in the ADA experience that suggests the accommodation
requirement will “swallow the rule” allowing employers to set dress and grooming standards. It
will simply make that rule less absolute.
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facilities, provided that the employer’s rules and policies adopted
under this section afford reasonable accommodations based on
gender identity to all employees.146

Just as with Section 7, this provision allowed employers to maintain
policies relating to sex-specific facilities, but required them to provide
reasonable accommodations, which are not defined. In essence, both
sections left it to courts to draw the line between the policies employers
are free to adopt and the ways in which they must adjust those policies
to afford equal protection to their transgender employees.
A final key compromise was contained in Section 3 of SB 296,147
where the Legislature asserted in a definitive non-severability clause
that the statute’s balance between anti-discrimination protections and
religious freedom had to be preserved:
This bill is the result of the Legislature’s balancing of competing
interests. Accordingly, if any phrase, clause, sentence, provision, or
subsection enacted or amended in this chapter by this bill is held
invalid in a final judgment by a court of last resort, the remainder of
the enactments and amendments of this bill affecting this chapter
shall be thereby rendered without effect and void.148

The Utah Legislature was determined to not only provide robust
protections for religion, but to ensure that if those protections did not
remain in place, the sections barring discrimination would not survive
either. It is not difficult to imagine the scenario in which this might
happen. Imagine a business owner asserting the statute’s religious
exemption in a motion to dismiss a suit alleging that an employer
refused to hire the plaintiff because she is a lesbian. The plaintiff could
well assert that the exemption constitutes an unconstitutional
establishment of religion on the theory that it favors a religious basis
for an employment practice over non-religious reasons for the same
practice. Section 3 of SB 296 means that such an argument would be
unavailing; even if the plaintiff prevailed on the constitutional
argument, the end result would be that the substantive protections she
seeks to invoke would be “rendered without effect and void.”149 It is

146. Section 8, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-110 (West 2019).
147. Section 3, 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 13 (S.B. 296), codified at UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A5-102.7 (West 2019).
148. Id.
149. Legislators employ severability clauses (provisions that instruct courts to preserve the
constitutional portions of a statute when striking down another section or sections) in statutes
much more frequently than the converse non-severability clause (calling for the whole statute to
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thus unlikely that any plaintiff would make that argument, and instead
would contend that the defendant in her case is simply ineligible for
the exemption.
The sections of SB 296 aimed at protecting religious views may not
have gotten the balance exactly right. My own view is that SB 296 went
further than a state legislature should to insulate an anti-discrimination
law from an accusation of anti-religious animus. In particular, the Boy
Scouts provision of Section 1 was unnecessary because it exempted a
secular organization on account of the religious beliefs of a powerful
interest group in the state and in the legislature. Such an exemption is
qualitatively distinct from an exemption for a religious entity and is
much harder to defend as the product of solicitude for religious
freedom.150 The point, however, is not whether the specifics of the Utah
law draw the right balance. The point is the importance of the effort to
draw a balance, both to insulate the resulting legislation from
constitutional attack under the Masterpiece Cakeshop paradigm, and
because of the political importance of balance for achieving legislative
success. It is apparent that the Utah legislature’s actions in enacting SB
296 are the precise opposite of the anti-religious intolerance that
bothered the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Indeed, it is
unimaginable that a court examining SB 296 would—or even could—
rule that the law is tainted by animus against religion. Some employers
with religious beliefs might be strongly opposed to being compelled to
hiring a lesbian or a transgender applicant, but it would be futile for
them to argue that the legislature showed disrespect, much less
intolerance, for their position.
B. Kentucky Drafting & Lobbying: Seeking Common Ground
Unlike Utah’s law, Kentucky’s statewide anti-discrimination law151
does not cover sexual orientation or gender identity. For well over a
decade, the principal goal of the state’s Fairness Campaign152
be struck down if any part is), as Utah enacted in Section 3. Nevertheless, the technique is not
unheard of. See Israel E. Friedman, Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 904
(1997) (arguing that courts should show “greater deference” to inseverability clauses than to
severability clauses).
150. Compare with Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
171, 190 (2012) (interpreting Title VII’s “ministerial exemption” broadly, but applying it
specifically to “government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church itself”).
151. KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 344.040 (2019).
152. See About Us, FAIRNESS CAMPAIGN, https://www.fairness.org/about-us/ (“The Fairness
Campaign is Kentucky’s LGBTQ advocacy organization founded in 1991 by 10 Louisvillians. Its
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(“Fairness”) has been to change this omission by persuading the state’s
General Assembly to include sexual orientation and gender identity
within the law’s protection.153 While Fairness has been successful in
persuading city officials in eighteen jurisdictions to pass local
ordinances,154 these laws together protect less than 30% of the state’s
residents from sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination.155
For many of the years Fairness lobbied the General Assembly to
pass a statewide law it could not even get a hearing from a legislative
committee156 and only garnered a limited number of sponsors in either
chamber.157 Although there has been progress, it has been slow, and the
organization’s most important accomplishments have often been in
stopping the passage of anti-gay bills rather than advancing civil rights
legislation.158 Thus, it has been imperative for Fairness and its leaders
to strategize ways to remove barriers to passage of certain laws and
move ever closer to success.
One of these barriers is the same as the one that had to be navigated
in Utah: the fear that compelling non-discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity would infringe on the rights of
religious employers and housing providers.159 For this reason, the same

primary goal is comprehensive civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation and gender identity and to dismantle systemic racism.”).
153. See LGBT Non-Discrimination Laws, FAIRNESS CAMPAIGN (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.fairness.org/issues/lgbtq-non-discrimination-laws/ (noting that “it is still legal in most
of Kentucky and the United States to discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (LGBTQ) people,” and that “[t]he Fairness Campaign advocates for passage of a Statewide
Fairness Law in the Kentucky General Assembly”).
154. See Sarah Ladd, Woodford County Becomes the First Kentucky County in 20 Years To
Pass A Fairness Ordinance, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/14/woodford-county-kentuckypasses-fairness-ordinance/4471655002/ (noting that Woodford County is “now the 18th
municipality in the commonwealth with protections for LGBTQ persons”).
155. See Chris Hartman, Until We Reach Equality, The Fairness Campaign Will Continue its
Fight, LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.courier-journal.com/
story/opinion/2019/01/25/lgbtq-rights-fight-fairness-kentucky-continues/2668983002/.
156. Id. (noting that the statewide bill has never received a vote and has been the subject of
only two “informational hearings” before legislative committees).
157. See Legislative Action, FAIRNESS CAMPAIGN, https://www.fairness.org/legislativeaction/
(noting that in the 2019 legislative session, the bill had a record number of co-sponsors, but those
records were only eight in the 38 member Senate and 21 in the 100 member House).
158. See Hartman, supra note 155 (“Each year, including this one, we fight against a flurry of
anti-LGBTQ laws in Frankfort, including invasive “bathroom bills” targeting transgender kids
and “license to discriminate” laws that could eradicate Fairness Ordinances where we have
them.”).
159. See Richard Nelson, Fairness Laws OK Intolerance, Create More Problems Than They
Solve, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (June 22, 2015), https://www.kentucky.com/opinion/oped/article44606205.html (arguing against passage of anti-discrimination protections on the basis
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imperative that presented itself in Utah faces the Fairness Campaign in
Kentucky: it must demonstrate a sensitivity and respect for religious
concerns, which will both make passage of the bill easier and—in light
of Masterpiece Cakeshop—insulate it from later attack on the basis of
alleged anti-religious intolerance.
I have already explained my view that Masterpiece Cakeshop makes
compromising with religious objections important, even if it may be
anathema to many proponents of LGBTQ civil rights.160 In a state like
Kentucky, compromise is also a political imperative, just as it was in
Utah.161 That was why members of the General Assembly worked with
leaders of the Fairness Campaign to make the bill162 less vulnerable to
claims that it would infringe on religious beliefs and practices.163 The
core idea was to merge the Fairness bill with elements of a religious
freedom bill that was introduced in 2018,164 proposing what amounted
to a “grand compromise,” one that could garner support on both sides.
Religious conservatives would find the opportunity to bolster
protections for religious liberty appealing, even if some argued they
were unnecessary in light of Kentucky’s existing Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.165
The primary virtue of a grand compromise was, of course, political.
Neither side could get what it wanted from the legislature, which had
rejected the religious freedom bill and the Fairness bill separately. If
both sides supported a merged bill, however, it could pass the General
Assembly, even if neither side would get everything it wanted.166
Moreover, beyond the political calculation, Masterpiece Cakeshop
of sexual orientation and gender identity because it would affect “employers publicly known for
embracing high moral standards in their workplace,” and it lacks an exemption for “clergy
operating in pastoral capacity outside their church facility”).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 124–125.
161. Id.
162. H.B. 164, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2019) (introduced).
163. See Personal Interview with State Representative Jason Nemes (Mar. 15, 2019)
(describing proposal to begin work on a “Grand Compromise” to achieve passage of an
antidiscrimination bill that the Fairness Campaign has been seeking, modified to include religious
protections that conservative groups had been lobbying to pass).
164. H.B. 372, Gen. Assemb., 2018 Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2018) (died in committee).
165. KY. REV. ST. ANN. § 446.350 (2019).
166. This carries echoes of the Utah effort, in which both sides recognized that they could
achieve their goals if they did not insist on getting everything they wanted. See Saal, supra note
128 (“LDS Church spokesman Michael Purdy said these sorts of issues are so polarizing that it
becomes a zero-sum game—one side has to lose everything in order for the other side to gain
anything. ‘And we just came into this with a different idea,’ he said. ‘It was much better for
everybody to get 90 percent of what they needed, than for somebody to get zero and another side
get 100 percent.’”).
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gives proponents of the Fairness bill an additional reason to
compromise: showing solicitude for religious beliefs and practices helps
insulate a law from attacks alleging that it promoted or was based on
religious intolerance.167
The remaining question is what language might be offered to enlist
the support of those who have previously been unwilling to support the
bill, and to craft a bill that shows solicitude for religious objections.
Much of this language would be familiar in light of the Utah provisions
discussed earlier.168 To begin with, the bill might state that the term
“employer” “does not include a religious organization or association, a
religious society, or a religious leader, when that individual is acting in

167. As of this writing, the proposed compromise legislation has not yet been passed, or even
formally introduced, in the General Assembly. Interview with Rep. Nemes, supra note 163. In
2019, this was due in part to a peculiarity in the Kentucky legislative calendar. The General
Assembly meets for only 30 legislative days in odd-numbered years, KY. CONST., § 36(1), and a
more robust 60 days in even-numbered years. Id. § 42. It is thus more difficult to pass legislation
in an odd-numbered year like 2019, especially legislation requiring delicate negotiation and
compromise. In this case, the difficulty was enhanced by reasonable differences of opinion over
how best to navigate the legislative labyrinth. One view was that it would be best to introduce the
compromise version of the Fairness bill from the outset (i.e., include the religious exemptions in
the initial text, making it different from the bill as it has been introduced in past sessions). This
would enable the sponsors, they hoped, to garner a record number of co-sponsors, have an
impressive array of community groups and leaders issue endorsements, and use that momentum
to spur the bill’s passage. A second group, however, believed that a better strategy would be to
introduce the Fairness bill with the provisions it had in the past and wait until a committee hearing
to introduce amendments. The concern was that if the amended version became the starting point
and did not pass, it would in future years be the starting point, with even more compromises
demanded by opponents. This would weaken the bill’s anti-discrimination protections and
perhaps lead supporters to abandon it as not worth the effort. See Personal Interview with Chris
Hartman, Director, Kentucky Fairness Campaign (February 28, 2020). The upshot of all this was
that, while the core Fairness bill was introduced in both the House, H.B. 164, Gen. Assemb., 2019
Reg. Sess., (Ky. 2019) (introduced), and the Senate, S.B. 166, Gen. Assemb., 2019 Reg. Sess., (Ky.
2019) (introduced), nothing more happened in the 2019 session. The bill did not include the
additional language reflecting an attempt to deal with religious-based objections, nor did it
receive a hearing where amendments to add such language could have been introduced to garner
support. The legislators who support the end goal—whichever strategy they favor—remain
optimistic that the concept of combining the Fairness bill with protective religious freedom
language, somewhat akin to the Utah approach, could do much to increase the ultimate chances
of success in future sessions. See Interview with Rep. Nemes, supra note 163. The 2020 session
has only just begun, and decisions about when to introduce the bill, and in what form, have not
yet been made.
168. The provisions I will outline are offered in the context of consideration of a Kentucky
bill, but would be useful in seeking a compromise outcome in any of the 26 states that currently
lack a statute barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. See
Nondiscrimination Laws, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.lgbt
map.org/equality-maps/non_discrimination_laws (surveying the states that do and do not provide
statutory protections).
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the capacity of a religious leader.”169 In addition, to deal with the fact
that the Fairness bill includes protection against discrimination in
services provided by places of public accommodation, the compromise
would define such places to “not include a religious organization or
association, or a religious society.”
Since definitions of religious leaders include those who represent
“religious organizations,” and since the compromise being discussed
would require that the definition of public accommodations exclude
“religious organizations,” it is important to provide a statutory
definition of a religious organization. The bill might do that by saying:
For purposes of this chapter, “religious organization,” “religious
society,” and “religious association” include, but are not limited to,
churches, mosques, synagogues, temples, nondenominational
ministries, interdenominational and ecumenical organizations,
mission organizations, and other entities whose principal purpose is
the study, practice, or advancement of religion.

Critically, the language would state that “a for-profit corporation shall
not qualify as a ‘religious organization,’ ‘religious association,’ or
‘religious society.’”
This limitation on religious exemptions is essential so that the
exemptions do not entirely swallow the anti-discrimination rule
created by the statute. As Professors NeJaime and Siegel point out, at
the same time that the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop demanded that
government act with respect for religious beliefs, the Court also made
clear that the framework of antidiscrimination laws applies equally to
sexual orientation and gender identity as it does to race.170
The bill would also provide protection for religious educational
institutions to “hire and employ persons of a particular religion,” so
long as the institution meets either of two criteria: the institution is “in
whole or in substantial part owned, supported, controlled, or managed

169. “Religious leader,” in turn, would be defined as “an individual who is an authorized
representative of a religious organization as defined in this chapter, including a member of clergy,
a minister, a pastor, a rabbi, an imam, or a spiritual advisor.”
170. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201, 208 (2018) (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018)) (footnotes omitted) (“The Court, then, does
not endorse a two-tiered system of antidiscrimination law in which some groups get full protection
and others get less. Instead, it adopts one public accommodations framework in which
government ‘can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring
whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to
other members of the public.’”).
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by a particular religious corporation, association, or society,” or the
“curriculum of the school . . . is directed toward the propagation of a
particular religion.”
Like the Utah bill, an explicit non-severability clause would be
necessary to assure those on both sides of the issue that, if the sections
that are important to them are struck down, they will not be left only
with the unpalatable parts. The Utah language could easily be utilized
in a parallel Kentucky bill:
This bill is the result of the General Assembly’s careful balancing of
competing interests. Accordingly, if any phrase, clause, sentence,
provision, or subsection enacted or amended in this chapter by this
bill is held invalid in a final judgment by a court of last resort, the
remainder of the enactments and amendments of this bill affecting
this chapter shall be thereby rendered without effect and void.

Adding provisions like these to the Fairness bill in Kentucky would
do much to arm its defenders in court with arguments that, far from
reflecting anti-religious bias, the law demonstrates the General
Assembly’s considered desire to avoid infringing on or burdening
religious practice.
It is important to stress that I am not arguing that such language is
necessary to defend the Fairness bill against constitutional attack. In
this respect, I agree with Professors NeJaime and Siegel that “the
requirement of evenhandedness [announced in Masterpiece Cakeshop]
does not translate into a mandate for exemptions.”171 While I agree with
Professor Hart172 in principle that the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause protects at least some providers of public accommodations—
those whose services can persuasively be shown to send a message—he
is far too vague in discussing the breadth of that category and how such
protection would affect the effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws. As
Professors NeJaime and Siegel suggest, “Often, advocates seek such
broad exemptions when they have the political power to extract them.

171. Id. at 204; see also Sager & Tebbe, supra note 109, at 175 (“[T]he Court reaffirmed that
religious actors are not constitutionally entitled to exemptions from public accommodations laws
under normal circumstances. These laws, which protect members of vulnerable groups against
discrimination by those who choose to provide goods and services to the public, are too important
to equal citizenship to allow for exemptions based on conscience.”). But see James Hart, When
The First Amendment Compels An Offensive Result: Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, 79 LA. L. REV. 419, 427–37 (2018) (arguing that compelling a baker to
prepare a cake for a same-sex wedding constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment, especially when the compulsion is not imposed on a viewpoint-neutral basis).
172. Hart, supra note 171, at 427–37.
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But Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests that our Constitution does not
require these broad exemptions.”173 Instead, I am arguing that such
compromises may be politically necessary to ensure an
antidiscrimination bill’s passage, and that they can be important
insurance to such a bill’s constitutionality under some conditions. Posit
a situation, for example, in which a handful of supporters of the bill
make comments on the floor or in a committee hearing, disparaging the
religious views of opponents who espouse anti-gay or anti-transgender
views. It is not difficult to imagine this scenario unfolding; there is a
particularly high risk that it would arise in “red states.” Debates over
issues relating to LGBTQ rights typically bring out strong
condemnations, often from religious sources, of the so-called “gay
lifestyle.”174 Understandably, these comments often produce equally
strong statements from supporters of LGBTQ-friendly legislation
lashing out at their opponents—the very sort of commentary that can
later be cited as evidence of religious intolerance.175
Such comments could supply the basis for a claim, parallel to the
one made in Masterpiece Cakeshop, that the bill was the product of
anti-religious intolerance. In light of the ample precedent in which the
Court has taken account of legislative purpose,176 challengers of the law
would have a powerful basis to argue that such expressions of
legislative intolerance are just as damaging as the expressions of
173. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 170, at 221–22.
174. See, e.g., Tina Indalecio, Persuaders of Hate: Anti-Gay Rhetoric From the Christian Reich,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (May 4, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/curiousmedia/201005/persuaders-hate-anti-gay-rhetoric-the-christian-reich (last visited Mar. 25, 2019)
(detailing religious rhetoric “trying to link homosexuality to child molestation and to criticize
activist groups, who in their eyes, are trying to promote the homosexual agenda”). As Indalecio
notes, “Some fundamentalists have even asserted that the Scriptures allow them, since they’re on
the side of righteousness, to mislead people intentionally.” Id. (quoting Irvine, J.M., 13 The Gay
and Lesbian Review Worldwide 15 (2006)).
175. It is for exactly this reason that proponents of a “persuadable middle” narrative have
urged that a key dimension of winning support for LGBTQ rights (such as marriage equality) is
to avoid anti-religious rhetoric; it is seen as evidence of intolerance in the eyes of those who might
otherwise be sympathetic to arguments for LGBTQ rights. See Michael R. Woodford, et al., The
“Persuadable Middle” on Same-Sex Marriage: Formative Research to Build Support among
Heterosexual College Students, SEX RES. SOC. POL’Y at 9–12 (2012) (noting that those with neutral
views on same-sex marriage are more likely to be religious than those who support it, and that
“[p]urposeful outreach to students who . . . consider religion to be important in their lives may
help to foster allies for same-sex marriage”); Mathew Stange & Emily Kazyak, Examining the
Nuance in Public Opinion of ProLGB Policies in a “Red State”, SEX RES. SOC. POL’Y, at 9–10
(2016) (noting correlation between the strongest religious beliefs and opposition to same-sex
marriage and/or support for civil unions only).
176. See supra note 111 (discussing McCreary Cty. and other cases in which the Court
accorded substantial weight to legislative purpose in finding government action to be
unconstitutional).
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administrative intolerance were in Masterpiece Cakeshop. In such a
scenario, those defending the law would be in a stronger position if they
could point out that the substance of the law actually demonstrates an
abiding respect for religious freedom. Of course, it would also be
helpful if there is clear legislative history apart from the offensive
comments, indicating the General Assembly’s intent to achieve the sort
of balance Justice Kennedy suggested in Masterpiece Cakeshop is the
lynchpin of the analysis.177 In short, a two-pronged approach that
anticipates and heads off accusations of religious bias is critical:
substantive compromise, and religious tolerance in the legislative
process.
Adding provisions like these to the Fairness bill in Kentucky and
similar states would do much to arm its defenders in court with
arguments that, far from reflecting anti-religious bias, the law
demonstrates the General Assembly’s considered desire to avoid
infringing on or burdening religious practice.
CONCLUSION
Masterpiece Cakeshop seems to reflect the Court’s decision to put
off for another day what it could not decide that day: the proper
balance between anti-discrimination laws and claims of religious
freedom to discriminate.178 While it may be troubling that the Court was
unable or unwilling to reaffirm its long-standing position that antidiscrimination laws are not subject to any sort of constitutionallyrequired religious exemption,179 there is a silver lining. The Court

177. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018) (“The
case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first
is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of gay
persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or
services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First
Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also NeJaime
& Siegel, supra note 170, at 203 (arguing that the balance the Court drew in Masterpiece Cakeshop
“reaffirm[ed] the public accommodations settlement forged over a half-century ago,” and
“recognize[d] that the government’s interest in securing equal opportunity is as important as the
government’s responsibility to ensure neutrality in adjudication”).
178. See Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission: A Troublesome Application of Free Exercise Principles by a Court
Determined to Avoid Hard Questions, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (June 7, 2018), https://www.gwlr.org/
masterpiece-cakeshop-a-troublesome-application/ (“The majority’s emphasis in Masterpiece on
government animus to Phillips’s religious convictions . . . was an artifice that allowed the Court to
avoid the substantive merits of the case.”).
179. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (characterizing as
“patently frivolous” the “defendants’ contention that the Act was invalid because it ‘contravenes
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provided helpful guidance in how to insulate legislative action from
claims of anti-religious bias or intolerance of the kind that doomed the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s enforcement effort. Careful
attention to that guidance gives advocates for LGBTQ rights another
reason, grounded in constitutional concerns, to do that which is
politically savvy anyway.

the will of God’ and constitutes an interference with the ‘free exercise of the Defendant’s
religion’”).

